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Abstract
This paper argues that the crisis was an outcome of EMU: setting
a common monetary policy for countries with di¤erent initial in‡ation
rates. The crisis countries were those with high in‡ation rates which then
had negative real interest rates and consequently over-borrowed. Current
policy discussions focus on crisis measures: …scal, banking and political
union, not avoiding another crisis. This paper suggests two ways to avoid
a future crisis: o¤set an inappropriate monetary policy using …scal policy;
markets could better price loan rates by taking into account default risk.
The paper shows that neither was done prior to the crisis.
JEL Classi…cation: E52, E62, H63, H68
1 Introduction
The contention of this paper is that the euro crisis originated in the introduction
of a single currency which set a common monetary policy for countries with
di¤erent initial in‡ation rates. The expectation was that in‡ation rates would
converge making a single monetary policy for all countries viable. The outcome,
however, was that countries with the highest in‡ation rates - which were also
the crisis countries - had too low o¢cial interest rates, negative real rates, rapid
output expansion which fuelled continuing higher in‡ation, and caused a loss
of competitiveness compared with low in‡ation euro countries. Depending on
the crisis country, the negative real interest rates and strong economic activity
encouraged excessive private or public borrowing which led to banking and debt
crises.
¤This paper was presented at the Bank of Greece conference The Crisis in the Euro Area,
Athens, 23-24 May, 2013.
yCardi¤ University; politov@cardi¤.ac.uk
zCardi¤ University, University of York, CEPR fellow, CESifo fellow;
mike.wickens@york.ac.uk
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The solution proposed by the European Commission (EC) and supported by
the European Central Bank (ECB) is to set up a …scal union, a banking union
and a political union together with strict (and common) rules on …scal de…cits
and sovereign debts. To many this appears to be a high price to pay to ensure
the survival of the monetary union. To some it is a roundabout and dirigiste
way of achieving political union. To a large extent, however, these are crisis
measures, and are not required in normal times. To avoid a future crisis, and
hence to obviate the need for such an intrusive solution, far less drastic solutions
may su¢ce, as explained in this paper.
In this paper we draw upon previous research of the authors on European
Monetary Union (EMU), …scal sustainability and sovereign credit risk (Polito
and Wickens (2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b) and Wickens (2010a, 2010b)
where a full set of references may also be found) to explore ways to lessen the
likelihood of a future crisis. We consider potential …scal and market solutions.
If monetary policy is inappropriate, a country needs to use its …scal policy to
compensate. This implies that instead of imposing an upper bound on the …scal
de…cit that is common to all countries (3% of GDP), it may be necessary to
have an even tighter …scal policy than this to o¤set a too loose monetary policy
for that country.
It is striking that, following the introduction of the single currency, govern-
ments were able to borrow at the same short interest rate. As previously noted,
this resulted in negative real interest rates for high in‡ation countries. Even
the private sector was able to borrow at negative real rates in most of the crisis
countries. This was also in marked contrast to the much higher market rates
that prevailed prior to the introduction of the euro. Signi…cantly, a consequence
of the …nancial crisis has been that borrowing rates have returned close to, or
above, pre-euro levels due to the market pricing in the risk of default. This
suggests that there may be a market solution to the problem of the single cur-
rency. Although the ECB is able to set only a single interest rate, the market,
by pricing in risk, can set borrowing rates for each country according to their
individual economic circumstances. In this way, the market might be able to
provide the correct monetary policy for each country. A corollary of this argu-
ment is that the euro crisis was less a problem with the euro per se, and more
a failure of markets to correctly price default risk or, more generally, to take
account of …nancial frictions.
The paper is set out as follows. In Section 2 we present evidence in support
of our explanation of how the crisis evolved. In Section 3 we examine the
…scal stances of EU countries in the build up to the crisis how they worsened
afterwards due, in large part, to the decline of GDP. In particular, we consider
the extent to which the …scal stance o¤set monetary policy. In Section 4 we
suggest a new way to evaluate the …scal stance. This is based on a country’s
credit rating. Rather than use o¢cial credit ratings, which during the crisis
have often appeared to be inappropriate, we use our own estimates of sovereign
credit ratings which are based on explicit …scal fundamentals. These credit
ratings may be linked to credit spreads and to default swap rates which indicate
how markets should adjust borrowing rates above the o¢cial interest rate and
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thereby apply a correction to o¢cial monetary policy appropriate for individual
country circumstances.
2 The role of EMU in the crisis
It is widely accepted that the euro zone was not an optimal currency area
prior to its inception. Of particular signi…cance was the di¤erence in member-
countries in‡ation rates. It was thought that these would converge over time
but having a single monetary policy based, in e¤ect, on low German in‡ation
rates prevented this. The consequence was that countries with the highest
in‡ation rates - what turned out in 2008 to be the crisis countries: Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain - suddenly had negative real interest rates.
As a result, borrowing increased dramatically. In the case of Greece and Italy
this was public borrowing; in the case of Ireland, Portugal and Spain it was
private borrowing, mainly for real estate. The consequence was that economic
activity in the crisis countries was strongly stimulated, in‡ationary pressures
mounted instead of lessened and competitiveness was lost. Meanwhile, given
its remit, the ECB was powerless to do anything about this. Indeed, to judge
by ECB publications and speeches, the problem seems not even to have been
perceived despite being a logical consequence of the New Keynesian model that
underpinned ECB monetary policy, see Wickens(2012, ch 14).
The evolution of national price and output levels before the crisis strongly
supports this argument. Selected country price level increases are shown in
Figure 1. As predicted, the crisis countries have much greater increases than
Germany. After the crisis price levels ‡atten out in all countries.
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The e¤ect of the initial conditions prior to the inception of the euro are
re‡ected in Figure 2 in which we plot the average rate of in‡ation prior to the
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crisis against their initial rate of in‡ation in 1999 for all euro countries. There
is a very strong positive relation between the two. This provides no support
for the convergence of in‡ation rates; on the contrary, they appear to diverge
further.
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Cumulative output growth for selected countries is shown in Figure 3. The
growth of output in Greece, Ireland and Spain is much stronger than that of
Germany. After the crisis output growth is strongly a¤ected by the crisis in
these three countries.
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In Figure 4 we show that prior to the crisis cumulative output growth and
price level increases have a strong positive relation for all euro countries. Again,
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as predicted, in Greece prices increased by 38% and output by 47%, the cor-
responding numbers for Ireland are 41% and 63%, and for Spain are 44% and
41% while those for Germany are 9% and 16%. Thus, comparing the price
levels, Greece lost 29% of its competitiveness against Germany, Ireland 32%
and Spain 35%. Not surprisingly these countries experienced growing current
account de…cits.
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The e¤ect of in‡ation on real interest rates (the o¢cial rate minus in‡ation)
is shown in Figure 5. Prior to the crisis real interest rates were largely negative
in the crisis countries. After the crisis they peaked in all countries in 2008.
In Ireland where they rose to 7 per cent. They also rose sharply in Spain but
did not exceed 2 per cent. Throughout the whole period Germany had positive
real interest rates. The relation between real interest rates and output may be
inferred from Figure 5 by inverting the vertical axis, implying that the lower
the real interest rate, the greater is output growth.
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Taken together this evidence provides strong support for the argument that
EMU, with its one-size-…ts-all monetary policy, is likely to have been a major
contributor to the crisis due to causing in the crisis countries low real interest
rates which encouraged borrowing and led to strong but unsustainable economic
growth, a failure of in‡ation rates to converge, a loss of competitiveness and
current account de…cits.
If the ECB is powerless to set a monetary policy stance that is appropriate
for all eurozone countries then for EMU to be sustainable there needs to be
an o¤setting e¤ect. In principle, …scal policy could be used to achieve this;
having given up ones monetary policy one would then have to use …scal policy
to compensate. Later we consider whether there might also be a market-based
solution. First, we consider the …scal stance of EU countries in recent years.
3 The Fiscal Stance of EU Countries
The …scal stance of EU countries plus the US is shown in Figure 6 which reports
government expenditures, revenues and debt 1999-2012. It is clear that there
was a deterioration in the …scal stance of most countries from 2008. This was
largely due to rising expenditures as a proportion of GDP, while tax revenues,
although falling in absolute terms, were fairly constant as a proportion of GDP.
The common factor in this is the fall in GDP as expenditures stayed roughly
constant but revenues fell with the fall in GDP.
It is also clear that from the start of EMU none of the crisis countries adopted
a tight …scal stance in order to o¤set the expansionary e¤ects of monetary policy.
Even prior to the crisis, however, in Greece, Italy and Portugal expenditures
exceeded revenues. In Ireland the budget was close to balance, and in Spain
revenues exceeded expenditures causing debt to fall, implying that in neither
country was the crisis due to excessive government borrowing, but excessive
6
private borrowing. Nonetheless, …scal policy was not used, or su¢cient, to
o¤set this. Perhaps one reason why the …scal positions of many of the crisis
countries was not a concern prior to the crisis was that strong GDP growth
boosted tax revenues.
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
0
50
100
AUS
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
0
100
200
BEL
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
0
50
100
DEN
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
40
60
80
FIN
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
0
100
200
FRA
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
0
50
100
GER
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
0
100
200
GRE
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
0
100
200
IRE
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
0
100
200
ITA
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
0
50
100
NET
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
0
100
200
POR
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
0
50
100
SPA
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
40
60
80
SWE
99:4 03:4 08:4 12:4
0
100
200
UK.
DEBT
EXP
REV
Figure 6. Fiscal data for EU countries 1999-2012
A related question is whether the …scal stance in eurozone countries can
be measured and monitored in a meaningful way. Econometric analyses of
…scal policy sustainability are based on the assumption the government budget
constraint (GBC) must hold in present value terms over the in…nite horizon.
This imposes weak restrictions on future …scal policy, but does not provide any
relevant policy prescription. Polito and Wickens (2011, 2012a) have suggested
an index of the …scal stance which addresses this question. Unlike the standard
econometric tests of …scal sustainability, the index is suitable for assessing …scal
policy in the short and medium term as it can measure whether a government
is under- or over-borrowing relative to a pre-speci…ed debt target. It can also
quantify the required …scal consolidation needed to achieve that target at any
future time horizon.
The index is derived from the (GBC) as a proportion of GDP:


= (1 + )
¡1
¡1
+


(1)


=


+


¡ 

where  is the primary de…cit inclusive of seigniorage revenue,  is government
expenditures,  are transfers,  are tax revenues including seigniorage revenues,
 is debt,  is GDP and
 =
1 +
(1 + )(1 + )
¡ 1
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is the real interest rate adjusted for economic growth, with ,  and  de-
noting the nominal interest rate on debt, the rate of growth of GDP and the
in‡ation rate respectively.
The index of the …scal stance in a speci…c period  measuring the …scal
adjustment over the time horizon ,  ( ), is derived from a log-linear
approximation about its steady-state value of the n-period ahead solution to
the GBC, equation (1). It can be written as
( ) =
(1 + )
¡
ln( ++ )
¤
() exp[
P
=1 (1 + )
¡
(+)]
 =  +


ln


+


ln


¡ 

ln


+ (1 + ) ln(1 + )
where variables without a  subscript denote steady-state values, ln( ++ )
¤ is
the debt-GDP target to be achieved by period  +  and + denoting the
expectation based on information available in  of the logarithmic equivalent of
the future primary de…cit, see Polito and Wickens (2012a) for details. The index
therefore measures in period  the ratio of the desired level of the discounted
debt-GDP ratio in period + to its forecast value. A value of the index equal
to, above or below 1 implies that the forecast debt-GDP ratio for period + is
on, above or below target, respectively. In the latter case, the level of discounted
debt-GDP ratio is forecasted to be above its desired value, suggesting that …scal
policy is too loose. Only as  ! 1 does the index provide a measure of …scal
sustainability in the same sense as the econometric tests, namely, whether the
government budget constraint holds in present value terms over the in…nite
horizon.
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Figure 7. Index of the …scal stance for EU countries
The index is plotted for eurozone countries in Figure 7 from 1979-2011 to-
gether with 95% con…dence bands under the assumption that …scal policy aims
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to keep the debt-GDP ratio constant over a 1-year ahead horizon (i.e.  = 1).
It is clear from the variability of the index that the …scal stance is not constant
through time. All countries show a decline in the ability of governments to meet
their debt obligations following the crisis in 2008, re‡ecting the loss of output
mentioned above. Of the crisis countries, Greece, Ireland and Spain show the
greatest …scal deterioration. Prior to the crisis Italy, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain had viable …scal stances, but Greece did not. More importantly, the …scal
policy adjustments vary over time and from country to country. Achieving the
same …scal de…cit as non-crisis countries - as is being proposed - is not su¢cient
for the crisis countries. What is required is a country-speci…c …scal policy that
o¤sets the expansionary e¤ects of monetary policy.
One possible response is either to reduce expenditures or to raise tax rates.
The IMF (2009a, 2009b) has proposed an ad hoc rule in which 2/3 of the
adjustment should be by reducing expenditures (including transfers) and 1/3
should be by raising tax revenues, see Cottarelli and Viñals (2009). In Polito
and Wickens (2012a) we estimate the average annual adjustment in the budget
de…cit (%GDP) required to restore the debt-GDP ratio to the pre-crisis 2007
level by 2016 and 2030, based on data up to 2011. Bringing the debt-GDP ratio
back to its 2007 level is regarded by the IMF as not only a reasonable goal,
but a minimum requirement of any viable strategy for restoring a normal …scal
stance, see Cottarelli and Viñals (2009). The results for the crisis countries are
reported in Table 1. Not only do …scal consolidation plans vary from country
to country, they also depend on the required timing of the …scal adjustment.
Clearly longer time horizons make …scal adjustments more feasible to achieve.
Table1
Average annual tax increases required to restore
the 2007 debt-GDP ratio by 2016 and 2030.
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
2016 6.6 11.3 3.3 3.2 3.3
2030 1.4 1.8 0.7 0.9 0.5
4 The Market’s View: Interest Rates and Credit
Ratings
4.1 Interest rates
If …scal policy did not o¤set monetary policy in countries where it was inap-
propriate, did the market do so? As noted, prior to EMU most of the crisis
countries faced much higher borrowing costs than they did afterwards as gov-
ernments could borrow close to the o¢cial ECB interest rate before 2008 and
the private sector interest rates were similarly low. In principle, there is no
reason why markets shouldn’t adjust rates to re‡ect the risk of default. After
the crisis this is precisely what they did, but they failed to do so before. Bond
risk premia are usually the result of in‡ation or interest rate risk rather than
9
default risk, but when bonds are priced in the same currency, and with the same
o¢cial interest rate, this sort of risk no longer distinguishes the prices of bonds
of individual countries.
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Figure 8. Short and long interest rates for EU countries 1999-2012
Short-term (3-month) and long-term (10-year) interest rates for EU countries
from 1999-2012 are shown in Figure 8. It is clear that prior to the crisis there
is little di¤erence in the rates charged to eurozone countries. After the crisis
long rates rose sharply in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, but not in
non-crisis countries. It would therefore appear that prior to the crisis markets
did not price in default risk and so did not act to o¤set the o¢cial rates set by
the ECB, though they did so after once the crisis occurred.
4.2 Credit Ratings
Sovereign credit ratings provide an alternative measure of the market’s assess-
ment of default, and hence they could indicate to markets what interest rates
to charge. As can be seen in Figure 10 below, with the exception of Greece, all
the crisis countries received an investment grade rating and only after the crisis
- usually some time after the crisis - were their ratings reduced close to (or to)
speculative grade. It would therefore appear that market-based credit ratings
did not anticipate the crisis either, rather they were even late in registering the
crisis. The three main credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and S&P) have
been criticised for their failure to react quickly to the crisis. This applies equally
to the credit ratings for the United States and the United Kingdom as to eu-
rozone countries and prompted Polito and Wickens (2012b, 2013a and 2013b)
to explore the possibility of constructing sovereign credit ratings in a di¤erent
way based on readily available …scal data. An advantage of this approach over
the …scal stance index reported above is that it doesn’t require an arbitrary
debt-GDP target, yet processes the same information.
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The idea is to forecast the probability that the debt-GDP ratio over a given
horizon is likely to exceed the maximum debt-GDP ratio that a country can
repay. This probability is then mapped into a credit rating using historical
records on credit ratings and default probabilities that was provided by Moody’s.
The forecasts are based on evaluating the intertemporal government budget
constraint whose components are derived from a rolling-window VAR with time-
varying volatility. This implies that not just the point forecast of the debt-
GDP ratio but also its distribution may change over time thereby re‡ecting
structural change, perhaps due to policy. The debt-GDP threshold is obtained
from an open-economy real business-cycle model with distortionary taxation.
The threshold can be based either on anticipated future changes in tax policy,
or on the maximum revenues that can be generated if unanticipated changes
in future tax rates were to occur. The resulting debt-GDP values are referred
to as the intertemporal government budget constraint limit (IGBCL) and the
…scal limit (FL), respectively. The concept of a …scal limit was …rst introduced
by Davig, Leeper and Walker (2011). Both the tax rates and the debt-GDP
threshold are calibrated to each economy and vary over time. The thresholds
fall after the crisis due to rising interest rates and so lower the credit rating.
Full details are given in Polito and Wickens (2013b). Here we provide a brief
description.
The debt-GDP ratio is forecast using the solution to the GBC compounded
¡periods ahead, equation (1),
+
+
= ¡
X
=1
·
¦=1
¡
1 + +
¢ +
+
¸
+ ¦=1
¡
1 + +
¢ 


The cumulative probability of defaulting within the -period horizon is
+ = §

=1+
where
+ = + (1 ¡ +¡1) (1 ¡ +¡2)  (1 ¡ +1)
+ = Pr
µ
+
+
¸ +
+
j 

¶
+ is the probability of sovereign default by period  + , + is the prob-
ability of default in period  +  and ++ is the default threshold (debt-GDP
limit).
The IGBCL derived from anticipated future expenditures and revenues,
which are based on existing policy, is



= ¡
1X
=1
+
+
+
+
+
¡ ++ 
Y
=1
¡
1 + +
¢  (2)
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The FL, based on the same expenditures, but now maximizing revenue from
labour and capital taxes is



= 
1X
=1
+
+
+
+
+
¡ 
max
+
+
Y
=1
¡
1 + +
¢  (3)
where
max+
+
is the maximum tax revenue, see Polito and Wickens (2013). The
empricial computation is based on the stationary equilibrium solutions of the
two debt limits in equations (2) and (3).
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Figure 9. Debt-GDP limits for EU countries
In Figure 9 we show the IGBCL, the FL and the current debt-GDP ratio over
the period 1995-2012. We observe that both debt limits vary over time; usually
then get tighter after 2008. For all countries FL lies above IGBCL, implying
that there is room to raise more tax revenues. But the gap is very small for
many countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy and
Sweden). This suggests that there is greater scope in these countries for raising
their borrowing capacity by reducing expenditures than by increasing taxes.
For all countries except Greece and, after 2008, Italy and Portugal, the actual
debt-GDP ratio lies below the IGBCL. This implies that for these countries
the present value of expected discounted future primary surpluses was large
enough to …nance the current level of debt. For Greece this was not the case for
the whole period, and the gap widened considerably from 2007. For Italy and
Portugal this doesn’t hold from 2008, while for Ireland and Spain the gap closes
markedly after 2008. Once again, therefore, the evidence points to a failure to
tighten …scal policy in the crisis countries prior to 2008, and to a worsening of
the …scal stance from 2008.
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Figure 10. Historic and model-based credit ratings for EU countries
In Figure 10 we report our measure of the credit ratings for a …ve-year
horizon based on FL together with the o¢cial historic ratings over the period
1995-2012. The solid line is the new credit rating estimate. While the two
ratings are similar for non-crisis countries, they di¤er for the crisis countries.
Although the o¢cial credit rating for Greece is several notches below triple-A
throughout, our measure of the credit rating is speculative grade from roughly
the point at which Greece joined EMU in 2002. Our measure also indicates an
earlier downgrade than the o¢cial ratings for all of the other crisis countries.
This suggests that the rating agencies appear to have reacted too slowly to the
crisis and that a better processing of available …scal data may have prevented
this.
Another interesting …nding is that after the crisis the o¢cial ratings for
Ireland and Spain are well below our measure, which indicates a much faster
recovery. This disparity may re‡ect the cause of the crisis in these countries
being excessive private, and not public, borrowing. Before the crisis both coun-
tries received a triple-A rating from the two measures, which is consistent with
the previous …ndings that the public …nances were not a potential problem. It
is only when the two governments started to bail out their private banks that
the historic ratings were downgraded. Our measure, which focuses on the …scal
stance, suggests that the underlying position is stronger than the o¢cial ratings
allow.
Credit downgrades are feared by governments because markets are more
reluctant to hold their debt which causes a fall in bond prices, implying a much
higher interest rate on new issues or for rolling over debt. The case of the UK is
of interest. Although not in EMU, and so not directly a¤ected by the eurozone
crisis, throughout the …nancial crisis the UK received a triple-A o¢cial rating. It
was only in February 2013 that the UK was downgraded one notch by Moody’s
and later by Fitch, in April 2013. Compared with our measure this response to
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the crisis appears to be too late. Moreover, by 2012, the UK appears to have
recovered its triple-A rating. Further evidence of the mis-timing of the o¢cial
UK credit rating is given by the spread between Libor and the overnight swap
rate (OIS). This is shown in Figure 11. Although markets did not anticipate
the crisis, they clearly responded much earlier than the credit rating agencies,
and they reduced the spread much earlier. The correspondence between our
measure of the UK’s credit rating and this spread suggests that model-based
sovereign credit ratings can provide a timely warning and indicate when changes
in interest rates are warranted. We have obtained similar …ndings for the United
States (Polito and Wickens, 2012b) based on comparing our measure of the US
credit rating with credit default swap data.
Figure 11. The spread between LIBOR and UK overnight swap rates
We have suggested that markets might be able to o¤set a monetary policy
set for the whole eurozone that is inappropriate for some eurozone countries
by adjusting the rates at which these particular countries can borrow from the
market. Our analysis in this section suggests that this did not happen prior to
the eurozone crisis but, once the crisis occurred, markets did raise rates sharply
for the crisis countries; they were back to levels observed prior to the start of
EMU. Further, o¢cial credit ratings did not re‡ect the risk inherent in the …scal
stances of the crisis countries, or did so too slowly. Therefore, while markets
could, in principle, o¤set the one-size-…ts-all monetary policy of the eurozone,
the evidence suggests that, in practice, they failed to do so.
5 Conclusions
The attention of policymakers has turned to how to deal with the eurozone
crisis. Their recommendation is to make drastic changes to the eurozone by
creating a …scal union, a banking union and a political union. In this paper we
seek to understand how the crisis occurred, and what might be done to avoid
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similar mistakes in the future, rather than how to clear up after the crisis. In
this way it might be possible to avoid making such drastic treaty changes.
Our contention, supported by the evidence we present, is that the underlying
cause of the crisis was that monetary policy was too loose in the crisis countries
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Unlike the …nancial crises in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and even Germany and Switzerland, the
eurozone crisis was not due the U.S. sub-prime crisis. The reason monetary pol-
icy was too loose in the crisis countries was that the one-size-…ts-all monetary
policy set by the ECB is based on the eurozone’s rate of in‡ation which is dom-
inated by the rates of in‡ation of the core countries: Germany, France and the
Netherlands. Given its mandate, there is nothing that the ECB can do about
this. The crisis countries entered the euro with higher in‡ation rates than the
core countries and, rather than converge to the average eurozone in‡ation rate,
until the crisis, they remained higher. This was because the common interest
rate produced a negative real rate in the crisis countries which stimulated exces-
sive private or public borrowing, causing high GDP growth rates and thereby
maintaining initial in‡ation di¤erentials and a loss of competitiveness.
We suggest that there are two possible ways to avoid this intrinsic conse-
quence of having a single currency for independent countries, and hence the
need to rewrite eurozone treaties. First, national …scal policy can be used to
o¤set an inappropriate monetary policy. For countries with higher than av-
erage in‡ation, this implies having a tighter than average …scal stance. Note
that simply aiming to stay within the same (3% of GDP) …scal de…cit limit as
other countries - as has been proposed by the European Commission - may not
deliver a tight enough …scal stance if in‡ation is high. In e¤ect, this implies
that, having given up one policy instrument (monetary policy), a country then
has to commit its other policy instrument (…scal policy) in order to unravel the
harmful consequences of receiving in return an inappropriate monetary policy.
The main gain for this policy bargain is a …xed nominal exchange rate but, as
we have seen, not a …xed real exchange rate. The evidence we have presented
both on the …scal stance and on credit ratings indicates that …scal policy was
not used prior to the eurozone crisis to o¤set an inappropriate monetary policy,
hence the crisis. Nonetheless, it remains a potential solution for the future.
The second possible solution doesn’t require any policy intervention. It is
based on markets adjusting interest rates to o¤set low o¢cial rates by pricing
in sovereign risk. This is what happened after the crisis. The crisis countries
have been forced to borrow at much higher rates than before the crisis, rates
that are closer to those they faced prior to entering the euro. The evidence,
both on borrowing rates and o¢cial sovereign credit ratings, prior to the crisis
shows that markets did not anticipate the crisis. A possible reason for this
is that traditionally bond prices have primarily re‡ected price risk rather than
default risk. Once the crisis hit, interest rate spreads immediately re‡ected this.
What is needed is that bond prices better anticipate potential default. We have
suggested that a possible way to achieve this is via a model-based assessment of
sovereign credit ratings based on forecasts of …scal fundamentals. The …ndings
are encouraging. Our measure of sovereign credit ratings di¤ers from o¢cial
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ratings mainly for the crisis countries by better anticipating credit downgrades
before the crisis, and upgrades afterwards. This indicates that, although they
did not do so before, it might be possible for markets to provide a solution
to the inherent problems of a single currency by the better pricing of bonds
through taking sovereign default into account, and assessing this from …scal
fundamentals.
Finally, although not discussed in this paper explicitly, we note another way
that markets can help o¤set monetary policy. We have remarked that the loss of
competitiveness that resulted from the price level increases of the crisis countries
caused a real exchange rate appreciation and current account de…cits. In the
absence of nominal exchange rate adjustment, regaining competitiveness would
require costs to be kept under control. This entails having competitive labour
markets and strong productivity growth which are also market solutions.
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